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Ms. Mary Noonan
Utah Court of Appeals
4 00 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Ms. Noonan:
Re:

State v. Basford
Case No. 890281-CA

Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and the order issued orally by the court during oral
argument on August 28, 1990, Appellant, Ronald Basford, submits
this letter of supplemental authorities.
This letter of supplemental authorities is relevant to
the issue raised in Point IA of Appellant's Opening Brief at
5-11, the State's "confession" of error contained in Appellee's
Brief at 3-6, and the question raised by this Court during oral
argument as to the impact of dictum in a Utah Supreme Court
decision.
In State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1990), the
Utah Supreme Court analyzed the two-part test set forth in
State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983). In regard to the first
prong of that test, the Court stated:
Possessing a stolen vehicle also contains two
elements: (1) possessing a vehicle, and
(2) knowing or having reason to believe it was
stolen.
Id. at 18.
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The application of the first prong or principal test in
Hill was not necessary to the court's decision in Larocco. The
Larocco decision hinges on the application of the second prong in
Hill, and the impact of the passage of time. The language at
issue is therefore dictum.
The extent to which dictum from the Utah Supreme Court
controls this Court's decisions is not clear. There are no
statutory or procedural guidelines and Appellant was unable to
locate any Utah cases discussing the issue.
Cases from other jurisdictions indicate, however, that
although a lower court can consider and be guided by dictum,
dictum is not "authority" which controls a decision. See York
Typo Union No. 242 v. Maple Press Co., 442 F. Supp. 511, 517
(Penn. 1977) (case containing dictum is not authority).
In Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 262 Cal. Rptr.
513, 518 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1989), the court pointed out that it
is "axiomatic" that only the "ratio decidendi" of the California
Supreme Court is "fully binding on the lower courts of [that]
state. (citations omitted.)" Although dicta is not binding, it
is persuasive and "commands serious respect." The Court stated:
A statement which does not possess the force
of a square holding may nevertheless be
considered highly persuasive, particularly
when made by an able court after careful
consideration or in the course of an elaborate
review of the authorities . . . .
Id. at 518. See also Minelian v. Manzellar 263 Cal. Rptr. 597
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1989) (lower courts considered language of
case dicta and therefore not binding).
In Daniel v. Taylor, 808 F.2d 1401, 1404 (11th Cir.
1986), the Court noted that dictum from that same circuit (as
well as dictum from the Fourth Circuit) was not "binding
precedent."
The following cases also support a determination that
dictum from the Utah Supreme Court is not binding on this Court.
W.F. Browning, III et al v. Europa Hair, Inc., 243 S.E.2d 743
(Ga. App. 1978) (statement made by Court of Appeals on motion for
rehearing was "obiter dictum" and not binding on trial court to
which case was remitted); Gertz v. Welch, 680 F.2d 527, 533 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is critical to determine what issues were
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actually decided in order to define what is the 'law' of the
case • . . [Observations, commentary or mere dicta touching upon
issues not formally before the court do not constitute binding
determinations.11); People v. Schwimmer, 417 N.Y.S.2d 655, 659
(1979) (statements were dicta and not binding).
Black's Law Dictionary points out that " [statements and
comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal
proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to the
determination of the case in hand are obiter dictum, and lack the
force of adjudication." (emphasis added) Black's Law
Dictionary, 4th ed. (1968) 541.
The dictum in Larocco which suggests that there are only
two elements in Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 is not binding
authority on this Court. Although this Court should review and
consider dictum in Supreme Court decisions, it should also focus
on the background and circumstances giving rise to the statement
at issue in deciding whether the language is controlling.
In Larocco, the facts indicated that the defendant had
the intent to procure or pass title since he did in fact obtain
title to the vehicle in his name. An intent to procure or pass
title to a vehicle in one's possession necessarily includes a
purpose to deprive the owner of the vehicle. The analysis as to
the principal test of State v. Hill. 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), as
applied in Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18, does not hinge on
the intent requirement and would have been the same regardless of
whether the court included intent to procure or pass title as an
element under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112.
Furthermore, in making the statement, the court did not
engage in an "elaborate review of authorities" or make a careful
consideration of the issue which is now squarely presented to
this Court as to whether Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 requires an
intent to procure or pass title under all circumstances.
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FILED
AUG 3D 1990

JOAN C. WATT, #3967
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

Wftifci Cawiift m Achats

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

MOTION, STIPULATION AND
ORDER TO STRIKE BRIEF DUE DATE
UNTIL AFTER ALL TRANSCRIPTS
ARE PREPARED

v.
CAROLE D. MARTINDALE,

Case No. 900353-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,
Pursuant to Rules 22(b) and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, JOAN C. WATT, attorney for Appellant, hereby moves this
Court to rescind the previously set due date of September 14, 1990
and reset the due date for Appellant's brief up to and including
forty days from receipt of the complete transcript.
Defense counsel initially requested transcripts of both
circuit court and district court hearings.

Transcripts of the

district court hearings have been prepared; however, the transcripts
of circuit court hearings have not been filed.

All transcripts are

required to prepare the brief.
The brief is currently due September 14, 1990.

DATED this <3J&£ day of August, 1990.

CodBw
)AN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

STIPULATION
I, SANDRA L. SJOGREN, Assistant Attorney General, do hereby
stipulate to the extension requested herein.
DATED this

^'-^ day of August, 1990.

^ S A N D R A L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General

ORDER
Based upon motion of Appellant and stipulation of counsel
and good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that an extension of time be given to
Appellant for the preparation of Appellant's brief up to and
including forty days from receipt of the complete transcript.
DATED this

day of August, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
day of August, 1990.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No, 890281-CA
Priority No. 2

RONALD W. BASFORD,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant, Ronald Basford, refers this Court to
his opening brief for the statements of jurisdiction, the case, and
the facts.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
In addition to the issues outlined in Appellant's opening
brief at 1-2, the State's brief raises the following issue:
What is the appropriate remedy where there was
insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112?

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under either the interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-1-112 urged by the State or that urged by Mr. Basford,
Appellants conviction under that section should be reversed.

The

State concedes this point in its brief, agreeing that conviction
under that code section was inappropriate.
The appropriate relief under the circumstances of this case

is acquittal.

The trial judge acquitted Mr. Basford on the charge,

and this Court cannot look behind that acquittal even if it appears
erroneous.
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court disagrees that
acquittal is the appropriate relief, it nevertheless is precluded
from entering a conviction for anything greater than Joyriding, a
class A misdemeanor.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) explicitly

requires that a defendant have sought the relief for an alternative
conviction to be entered after a finding of insufficient evidence;
Mr. Basford has never sought entry of a third degree felony
Joyriding.

ARGUMENT
POINT
THE CONVICTION UNDER § 41-1-112 MUST BE REVERSED;
THE APPROPRIATE RELIEF AFTER REVERSAL IS ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL OR, ALTERNATIVELY, AT THE
MOST, CONVICTION FOR A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR JOYRIDING.
The State concedes that there was insufficient evidence in
this case to support a conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112
(1953 as amended) (State/s Brief at 4, 6). Although the State
reaches its conclusion based on a different analysis of the statute
than that of Appellant, regardless of the analysis adopted by this
Court, insufficient evidence exists and the conviction under
§ 41-1-112 must be reversed.
The State analyzes Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as
amended) to require a "mens rea of intent to procure or pass title
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to the vehicle,"

State's Brief at 5. While Appellant has no issue

with this interpretation of the statute, and, in fact, would desire
such an interpretation of the intent required under the statute, it
should be noted that an intent to procure or pass title necessarily
includes an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle.
In this case, since there is absolutely no evidence of either an
intent to procure or pass title to the vehicle or to permanently
deprive the owner thereof, the conviction under § 41-1-112 must be
reversed.
In his opening brief, Mr. Basford argued, first, that there
was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under § 41-1-112
and, alternatively ("Assuming, arguendo . . . "

Appellant's Opening

Brief at 12), that under the trial court's interpretation of
§ 41-1-112, Joyriding was a lesser offense of § 41-1-112. Under the
first scenario, Mr. Basford requested that his conviction be
reversed.

Appellant's Opening Brief at 11. Under the alternative

scenario, assuming the trial judge interpreted § 41-1-112 correctly
and Joyriding was a lesser included offense, Mr. Basford requested
that a class A misdemeanor Joyriding conviction be entered.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 16.
The State misreads Appellant's requested remedy when it
states "[t]he State agrees with Appellant that this case should be
remanded for entry of judgment of conviction for joyriding under
§ 41-1-109."

State's Brief at 6.

Mr. Basford intended such a

request only in the context of his argument contained in Point IB of
his opening brief that the greater offense under § 41-1-112 should
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be set aside1 and only insofar as it related to the class A
misdemeanor version of the statute.
When a case is reversed for insufficient evidence, a
judgment of acquittal rather than a new trial is the appropriate
remedy.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(2) (1953 as amended); Utah

Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1953 as amended); McNair v. Havwood. 666 P.2d
321, 324-5 (Utah 1983); Burks v. United States. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
The rationale for an acquittal rather than a new trial is grounded
in the protection against double jeopardy contained in the fifth
amendment and applicable to the States through the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution; Article I, § 12 of the
Utah Constitution; and the statutory provisions listed above.

See

generally Burks, 437 U.S. at 16-17.
In cases where there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction, a judgment for conviction on a lesser included offense
can be entered if (1) the defendant sought such a reduction and

1

Although Mr. Basford does not mean to suggest that he
requested the remedy articulated by the State under all
circumstances of this case, even if he had made such a request, the
appropriate remedy would nevertheless be a judgment of acquittal.
See McNair v. Havward. 666 P.2d 321, 324-5 (Utah 1983); Burks v.
United States. 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). In
Burks, the United States Supreme Court held that acquittal was the
appropriate remedy where a conviction was reversed for insufficient
evidence, even though the defendant had made a motion for new trieil
rather than acquittal.
In addition, even if the defendant had requested an
incorrect remedy, the State would be required to acknowledge the
appropriate remedy based on its duty to promote justice. See
State v. Bailev. 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah App. 1989). As the
United States Supreme Court stated in Burks, the only "just" remedy
after reversal for insufficient evidence is acquittal.
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(2) the trier of fact found every fact required for conviction of an
"included offense."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1953 as amended);

see State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985)
(Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) provides:
(5) If the district court on motion after
verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal
or certiorari, shall determine that there is
insufficient evidence to support a conviction for
the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included
offense and the trier of fact necessarily found
every fact required for conviction of that included
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may
be set aside or reversed and a judgment of
conviction entered for the included offense, without
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought
by the defendant.
In the present case, the State did not charge Mr. Basford
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109.

In the trial court, as part of his

argument based on State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969),
Mr. Basford argued that a conviction for a class A misdemeanor under
§ 41-1-109 was appropriate.

If this Court interprets § 41-1-112 as

either the defendant or State has urged it to do, § 41-1-109 is not
a lesser offense due to the distinct intent requirements.
Therefore, conviction for either a misdemeanor or felony under
§ 41-1-109 is not appropriate pursuant to the restrictions of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) when read in conjunction with double
jeopardy concerns.
In addition, the trial judge explicitly found that the
facts did not fit within § 41-1-109. R 11. He stated:
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The Court finds that the acts of the defendant fall
within Section 41-1-112 Utah Code Annotated, That
the elements of that crime differ from the elements
of the crime in Section 41-1-109• That the facts
stipulated to and the reasonable inferences thereof
do no[t] bring this matter within 41-1-109.
R 11.

In State v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1983), the

Court stated:

"A ruling that constitutes a factual resolution in

favor of the defendant on one or more of the elements of the offense
charged is acquittal."

Based on double jeopardy principles, the

Musselman Court determined that the case could not be retried,
reasoning that it "may not reassess an acquittal even though the
acquittal was made under an incorrect application of the law or an
improper determination of the facts."

Id. at 1065.

The trial judge's statement quoted above amounted to an
acquittal under § 41-1-109, and this Court is not free to reassess
that decision even if it appears erroneous.
Finally, even if this Court disagrees that acquittal is the
appropriate remedy, the only possible conviction that could be
entered is for a class A misdemeanor.2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5)

explicitly requires that a defendant have sought the relief in
question for an alternative conviction to be entered after a finding

2

Mr. Basford continues to maintain that if this Court
determines that acquittal is not appropriate and conviction for
Joyriding should be entered, the Joyriding is, at best, a class A
misdemeanor. The State's attempt to distinguish between an intent
to abandon the truck near where it was taken and an actual return of
the truck to the owner is meaningless in this case where Mr. Basord
was arrested less than twenty-four hours after the vehicle was
taken. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 15-16.
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of insufficient evidence on the greater offense.3

In this case, the

defendant at no time requested conviction under the felony Joyriding
statute, and such a remedy is therefore not appropriate.

CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant, Ronald Basford, respectfully requests
that this Court reverse his conviction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-1-112 and enter judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, enter
a conviction for Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor.
SUBMITTED this 35

day of June, 1990.

J/OJES C. BRADSHAW
ttorney for Defendant/Appellant

<3&Ca)citf
JOAN C. WATT

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

3

Appellant does not intend that this alternative argument
be interpreted as a request for such relief. If this Court
interprets § 41-1-112 as the State has urged it to do, Appellant
believes the appropriate remedy is acquittal. However, in the event
this Court disagrees, this argument is offered to establish that, at
most, this Court can enter a conviction for class A misdemenaor
Joyriding.
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

*^ST day of June, 1990.

JOAN C. WATT
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this
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